Israel Defence Forces during the 33-Day War of 2006


Par Pierre Pahlavi
Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 23, n°1, 2012

The new attention paid to ‘small wars’ does not seem to translate into a better adaptation of conventional armed forces to this type of conflicts. As illustrated by the IDF's inability to get a decisive edge against the Hezbollah during the 33-Day War, Israel is no exception to such difficulty to adapt. A number of analysts have concluded that, victim of its long experience gained through the Intifadas, Israel ‘over-adapted’ to irregular warfare. Applying a sociological framework inspired by the seminal work of Richard Scott, this study suggests that this view is, at best, arguable. Going beyond the classical military explanations by uncovering key sociopolitical forces that have shaped the Israeli defense institutions, this study proposes that the combination of a post-heroic society and unbalanced civil–military relations have led the Israeli military institution to opt for a conventional posture articulated around technocentric tenets, which are ultimately disregarding the true nature of the asymmetrical challenge presented by the Hezbollah.

En savoir plus