Stabilizing Mali
The challenges to conflict resolution

A Stabilizing Mali Project Report
2018
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Executive Summary

In September 2016, the Centre FrancoPaix launched a research project entitled ‘Stabilizing Mali: The Challenges of Conflict Resolution.’ Funded by the Government of Canada, the project sought to produce a rigorous scientific analysis of the situation in Mali. Ten research reports were published, each based on unique empirical data and written by a different member of the research team. Combined in this document after several conferences and consultations involving Malian and international stakeholders, they offer a multidimensional and multidisciplinary analysis of the Malian conflict and of the impact of the international intervention. This report is thus the product of various expertise and analyses of different aspects of the conflict. This report’s methodology is also based on engagement, discussion, and debate with academic colleagues, with decision- and policy-makers, with Malian and international stakeholders, and with actors of diverse background and experience.

The peace process in Mali is based upon an analysis that was valid in 2013-2015, but that it is no longer so in 2018 given the evolution of the situation. What drives Malian conflict dynamics in 2018?

Key findings:
➢ Mali’s state institutions continue to experience a dual crisis of capacity to fulfill their mandated functions and of legitimacy in the face of multiform unresponsiveness and uneven engagement with citizens' preoccupations;
➢ State-society relations are profoundly broken, particularly but not exclusively as these are manifest between members of the Malian Defense and Security Forces and the general public;
➢ Armed groups are increasingly fragmenting based along community and tribal lines of affiliation due to a degrading situation of banditry and insecurity;
➢ Jihadist actors are consolidating their governance of rural zones through coercion, but also through protection and other forms of service provision;
➢ International engagement in Malian conflict dynamics exacerbates tensions amongst the signatory groups, frustrate local communities due to either inaction (in the case of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSMA) or overt violent action (in the case of operation Barkhane). This is due to the focus on countering terrorism at the expense of supporting political efforts to introduce conflict resolution mechanisms and processes between the actors of the conflict, both signatory and non-signatory groups.

Key recommendations:
➢ The legitimacy of the Malian state must be strengthened through governance reforms that take seriously the limits and possibilities of administrative decentralization, the demands for the delivery of justice by the state, and the necessity of restructuring civil-military relations;
➢ The 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement’s Monitoring Committee must develop mechanisms to ensure the representation of the many actor groups that have been excluded from the process, including women's and youth organizations, and especially communities from the Centre of Mali, while MINUSMA must reassert its international leadership of the process;
➢ MINUSMA must redeploy the bulk of its peacekeepers in Central Mali so as to assist governmental efforts at restoring the legitimacy of the state in the area;

➢ International engagement in Mali must move away from the emphasis on the ‘war against terrorism’ in the Sahel and instead engage in collective strategic thinking for conflict resolution.
Stabilizing Mali

In September 2016, the Centre FrancoPaix launched a research project on conflict and international engagement in Mali. Entitled “Stabilizing Mali: The Challenges of Conflict Resolution,” the project sought to produce a rigorous scientific analysis of the situation in Mali. Eighteen months later, the research team has published ten analytical reports and four newsletters covering a wide range of issues: conflict dynamics in the north, the centre, and the south of Mali, terrorist groups, security sector reform, the “Tuareg question,” Malian women, the 2018 elections, demographic challenges, Operation Barkhane, and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

These analyses come at a critical time for Mali. A moribund peace process, government reforms that are making little or no progress, terrorist group advances, and a generalized upsurge in violence all pose threats on the eve of a presidential election.

The current situation is also conducive to reflection on the part of international actors. The strategic review of MINUSMA, the questions raised about the limits of France’s Operation Barkhane, and the efforts to organize the deployment of the joint force of G5 Sahel are responses to the numerous critiques of the international intervention and the evolution of the conflict dynamics.

Goal of the project

The situation in Mali is undeniably complex. There are manifest difficulties with the peace process and important limits to the international intervention and mediation. The members of the project’s research team do not claim to know all the answers or to be able to identify the solution to the conflicts in Mali, but we are confident that our approach will shed new light on the fundamental connections between the various dimensions of these conflicts, that it will provide very useful clarifications of the main issues and the relations between the actors, and that it will create avenues for reflection making it possible to break the stalemate in which the country and the international actors find themselves.

The primary objective of this process of analysis is to develop a wider and more thorough understanding of the possibilities for peace in order to support the Malian and international efforts to achieve reconciliation. Presented in a series of publications, the proposed analysis is thus a tool for the various actors who are constructing, implementing, and evaluating conflict resolution programs or activities in Mali. The study of the causes, the actors, and the conflict dynamics has been conducted with a view to clarifying the long-term issues underlying conflict transformation objectives.

Objectives of the report

The main objective of this document is to encourage discussion of the issues at stake in the conflicts and in the international intervention in Mali. This will amount to providing a concise summary of the conclusions of our published analyses. For the detailed results, readers are invited to read the individual reports. The recommendations presented here are meant to offer a “starting point” for a discussion whose aim must be to break the stalemate constituted by a peace process that continues to turn around in circles and by an endless series of military
interventions. Indeed, the particularly important point and the main challenge are the time limits: all of the actors involved in the conflict have a tendency to take action inside of short-term political horizons, and this makes it possible to neglect or to completely ignore sensitive fundamental issues as well as long-term political engagements.

**Methodology**

The text that follows summarizes the conclusions of ten analytical reports from the FrancoPaix Mali project (see Annex 1), which are available for free on the Centre FrancoPaix Web site.¹ The analyses presented in these reports are based on several months of research in Mali in particular, but also in Niamey, Ouagadougou, Paris, Brussels, New York, and Ottawa. Close to 400 interviews were conducted by the members of the research team or by Malian research assistants, as well as daily informal exchanges were had with various actors throughout the research process. Moreover, the core members of the research team met at regular intervals to debate the issues and the analyses.

This report is also the product of several workshops, conferences, and colloquiums where researchers with different nationalities and types of expertise, members of the Malian, Canadian, French, and other governments, representatives from MINUSMA and from non-governmental organizations, as well as ordinary citizens came together to discuss the issues at stake in the conflict in Mali. Among other events, an international colloquium was held in Montreal in May 2017 at the Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques, where the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Mahamat Saleh Annadif, and the Ambassador of the Republic of Mali, His Excellency Mahamadou Diarra, had the occasion to speak to the participants. During the first few months of 2018, events were organized in Paris, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Halifax, Brussels, New York, and Bamako. The most important event, the one in Bamako, was held at the École de Maintien de la Paix Alioune Blondin Beye in May 2018. It brought together researchers as well as Malian and international stakeholders. A first draft of this document was shared with the participants before the beginning of this event in order to fuel discussion and orient debate.

Of course, the analyses presented here have certain limits. Although they are supported by a significant amount of research on the ground, the researchers in Mali—with the exception of one Malian research assistant who was able to travel to the centre of the country—limited their work to Bamako. To compensate for this limitation, the data on the conditions outside of the capital were collected by way of Malian and UN interlocutors who were visiting Bamako, Niamey, or Ouagadougou. Credible secondary sources were also used. In addition, the analysis concentrated on the political and security aspects of the situation in Mali, and specifically on the dynamics of violence and the peace process. Other aspects were also taken into consideration to constitute an adequate national, regional, and international research context.

¹ [https://dandurand.uqam.ca/centre-francopaix/](https://dandurand.uqam.ca/centre-francopaix/)
Recommendations

The international efforts in Mali have different objectives that regularly contradict with each other. This is particularly the case for the objectives of the peacekeeping mission (led by MINUSMA) and those of the counterterrorism mission (led by France and its allies). The efforts to implement the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement having failed so far, some of the important players in the implementation process have limited their interventions to managing the effects of violence, to the short-term containment of threats, and to setting in place technical solutions. In such a context, the signatories to the Agreement have little motivation or conviction when it comes to implementing it. Without a consensus on the necessity of implementing it, bringing together the strategic conditions for successful negotiations has not been possible.

The peace process in Mali has been stalled by a logic that was valid in 2013-2015, but that it is no longer so in 2018 given the evolution of the situation and conflict dynamics. The main international response to this evolution has been to step up counterterrorism efforts by means of the G5 Sahel joint force, but the emphasis on the “war on terrorism” does not help resolve the conflicts in Mali. Put forward as the main strategy, counterterrorism pushes into the background the fundamental political questions that need to be asked about the nature of the conflicts, their underlying causes, and the potential solutions to them. When conflict resolution fails, it is not a war that should be imposed as a solution, but instead a redoubled political and strategic effort focused on the multiple dynamics of conflict in Mali. More than anything else, such an undertaking requires beginning from where the parties in conflict actually are with respect to some form of resolution, instead of from where the third parties want them to be.

The key challenges to conflict resolution in Mali

The legitimacy of the Malian state

Malian citizens’ perception of the state’s legitimacy is often discussed in connection with the latter’s inability to re-establish its authority by providing security. Unfortunately, there is too little discussion of the crisis in state legitimacy as a crisis related to governance, to the state’s usefulness to citizens, and to institutional representativeness. The 25 years of incomplete and uneven administrative reforms have left legacies of disagreements about the desirable and possible degrees of centralized and decentralized responsibilities and powers.

Recommendations:

i. Encourage governance reforms via a critical and uncompromising look at the limits and possibilities of administrative decentralization. This critical review will require and allow for a reconsideration of the forms of governance that are appropriate for the challenges of managing diversity and multiple inequalities under particularly difficult socio-economic, geographical, climatic and demographic conditions;

ii. Take seriously the demands for the delivery of justice by the state, without which conflict resolution cannot be sustainable;
iii. Recognizing that the histories of Mali's cultural and ethnolinguistic diversity are also those of inequality, domination and predation, state representatives deployed throughout the country should receive training on this diversity and its histories, in order to better manage differences and conflicts in practice (and to fight prejudice);

iv. Members of the Malian Defense and Security Forces must be blameless in their interactions with the civilian population. Security sector reform must be prioritized and focus on reforms of civil-military relations.²

What should be done about the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of 2015?

The 2015 Agreement does not reflect the conflict situation in 2018. The 2012 conflict has been transformed into multiple conflicts, armed groups have fragmented and then reconstituted themselves, and outbreaks of violence have been spreading with a worrisome tendency toward ethnicization and tribalism.

Recommendations:

a. Despite its failures, the Agreement and its implementation process must be preserved. The greatest achievement of the Agreement is that it allows the main actors to meet regularly;

b. The Agreement’s Monitoring Committee must develop mechanisms to ensure the representation of the many actor groups that have been excluded from the process, including women's and youth organizations, and especially communities from the Centre of Mali;

c. Recognizing Malian perceptions of the absence of the international community in the implementation peace process, MINUSMA must reinvest itself more into the process to ensure and regain its international leadership.

Central Mali

It seems that too few want to talk about Central Mali where the situation highlights the complexity of the conflicts; a complexity that goes beyond the commentary and the analyses focused on terrorism. The conflict dynamics suggest a multitude of deep issues, including governance, the justice system, land and property questions, intercommunal divisions, regional integration, climate change, economic development, and patriarchal institutions. These root issues have largely been beyond the control of the state or, worse, the state has been part of the problems.

Recommendations:

a. A redeployment of MINUSMA forces in Central Mali (in Mopti and Ségou, in particular) may be a difficult undertaking, but there is no escaping the fact that it would be the first step to ensuring a minimum of security and stability, especially since the Malian state seems incapable of accomplishing this;

b. Efforts to restore the legitimacy of the state (see point 1 above) must concentrate on Central Mali. These efforts will prove even more difficult than in the North, particularly in terms

² For more precise information on this issue, see Niagalé Bagayoko, Le processus de réforme du secteur de la sécurité au Mali (Montreal: Centre FrancoPaix, 2018).
of representation. Unlike the North, there is a need to properly identify the main leaders and interlocutors for the Centre.

**Ensure a transition from a “war on terrorism” posture to a strategic political engagement**

For the moment, counterterrorism military operations are monopolizing efforts and undermining possible initiatives for peace by postponing them indefinitely. The focus on the war against terrorism creates no incentive for the Malian state to pursue peace and reconciliation and justifies the mistakes and abuses of Malian security and defence forces. It also allows militias to benefit from a counterterrorist rent when they work with international counterterrorist forces, which exacerbates intercommunal tensions.

**Recommendations:**

a. The military instrument must serve a political strategy of conflict resolution. It must not dictate the international engagement. The challenge is to move away from the counter-terrorism paradigm;

b. Recognizing that counterterrorist forces, deployed in the same territory as MINUSMA, undermine the fundamental principle of impartiality, the Secretary-General must protect the integrity of UN peacekeeping. To this end, counterterrorist forces should not be authorized through the mandate of MINUSMA. The formulation of a peacekeeping doctrine could also be useful in this respect, by limiting the overstretched uses of the concept;

c. The Security Council must promote collective Malian strategic thinking. In such a context, every Malian group to the conflict should identify where they are, who they represent exactly, what their goals are and how they plan to attain them. This could overcome internal divisions and fragmentation of groups, bridge the gap between political elites and the people they represent, encourage transparency and inclusiveness (especially of women), give more voice to representatives of civil society, put silenced issues on the table and clarify the role of international stakeholders;

d. Conceptual work around the "terrorist" label must be encouraged by the UN and its partners, as the concept undermines a political commitment because of the military posture that it presupposes. A conceptual shift would help put forward a political rather than a military strategy.
The Conflict Situation

Six years after the conquest of its northern territories by a heterogeneous coalition, Mali remains bogged down in a situation characterized by numerous armed conflicts. However, the centres of gravity have shifted, and the conflicts themselves have changed significantly. To a large extent, the armed groups that were signatories to the 2015 Peace and Reconciliation Agreement have stopped fighting each other since signing a “definitive” ceasefire agreement on September 20, 2017, in Bamako. Nevertheless, the terrorist groups loyal to al-Qaeda’s central command have multiplied their attacks against the Malian armed forces and the representatives of the Malian state, as well as against the international forces and the signatory armed groups cooperating with them. This Islamist insurrection has consolidated its sphere of governance and influence in the centre of the country (above all in Mopti and the northern areas of Ségou) where attacks, like the one against the Timbuktu camp in April 2018, are becoming more and more frequent. These Islamist groups are also very active in the Ménaka and the Gao regions (in particular, on the borders of Burkina Faso and Niger), although they encounter the resistance of the signatory armed groups loyal to the Malian state.

While the implementation of the Agreement moves forward at a snail’s pace, insecurity continues to grow throughout much of the territory of Mali north of Bamako. The signatory armed groups consider that their influence has significantly decreased, for they have been unable to protect communities from the groups of bandits (made up of combatants from rival armed groups and, sometimes, even from their own), who are roaming the territory. The main impact of this growing insecurity is social fragmentation and a resulting proliferation of these armed groups. The latter are created through a strategy that consists in acquiring weapons and closing ranks with family members or persons from the “tribal” or ethnic community for protection. This has led to a significant undermining of social trust with communities mutually accusing each other of being responsible for fatal incidents and/or banditry. This was the case, for example, between the Arab and Songhai communities in the city of Gao in March 2018. Mounting insecurity significantly undermines the necessary conditions for *vivre ensemble* (‘living together’).

In this climate of insecurity, numerous Malian communities have found protection with Islamic insurgents. The latter initially succeeded in convincing them to seek their help to a large extent because the state authorities had abandoned much of the centre of the country after 2014-2015. These armed Islamist para-sovereigns have been able to increase their legitimacy in communities by providing services similar to those offered by a sovereign state, and by combining these services with episodes of violent coercion directed against those who seek support from state or international actors.\(^3\)

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\(^3\) For further details, see Adam Sandor, *Insecurity, the Breakdown of Social Trust, and Armed Actor Governance in Central and Northern Mali* (Montreal: Centre FrancoPaix, 2017).
This means that it is crucial to examine how the Malian state intends to “restore its authority” throughout the territory and reinforce its legitimacy in the mostly rural zones north of the capital. The challenge is immense given its reputation for rampant corruption, for clientelism and nepotism, for collusion with militia groups, and for human rights violations—and given the perception that it has not been sufficiently concerned about the situation. Although there is no magic formula for bringing back a national spirit and for re-establishing trust between communities, targeting or profiling communities that have had dealings with Islamic insurrectionists will only exacerbate the situation and undermine any possibility of dialogue, a key condition for the resolution of the conflicts.

Central Mali

Central Mali provides a good illustration of how a multiplicity of socioeconomic dynamics, including those shaping the formation and the activities of Islamist groups, can become inextricably intertwined. The transformation of the livestock and farming economy in the region of Mopti, particularly in the Inner Niger Delta, accentuated political rivalries. While the size of livestock populations in need of the rich pasturelands became larger, the area for transhumance was sharply reduced, mainly because of the state’s decision to promote the increased use of irrigated farming. Hence, tensions flared, especially between the Fulani herders coming from more arid regions and the Fulani “masters” of the Delta pasturelands and the farming communities.

Among the Fulani, certain local elites from dominant status-groups controlled access to the much sought-after pasturelands of the Delta and were able to extort higher and higher financial compensation for this access from so-called “foreign” Fulani communities, thus contributing to an increased sense of frustration among Fulani clans from outside the Delta region.

These conflict dynamics existed well before 2012, but they were exacerbated when the state’s retreat from Central Mali allowed armed Islamist groups to expand their operations. The formation of vaguely defined armed groups like the Katiba Macina, led by Amadou Kouffa, made it possible to reverse the power relations with these local elites, who now had a reduced capacity to impose their authority. Above and beyond the religious question, the appeal of these armed groups is based in large part on their capacity to change the unequal political and economic relationships between the dominant and the subservient Fulani lineages.

In a context where the state is largely seen negatively, Islamist actors can penetrate into the social fabric and take over the management of local affairs and government. Because of the actions of its representatives, the state is essentially seen as one of the sources of the injustice and insecurity that helped bring about the crisis. Civilian and military state officials are often perceived either as predators or as accomplices, working with local elites and their systems of domination and helping increase the level of abuse. This type of collusion helps legitimize the message of the armed groups whose attraction depends in large part on their promise to settle accounts with state officials.

Marie Brossier, Cédric Jourde, and Modibo Ghaly Cissé, Le Centre du Mali : Relations de pouvoir, logiques de violence et participation politique en milieu peul (Montreal: Centre Francopaix, 2018).
The State of the Malian State

The presidential election to be held in July 2018 will be a very important moment. The government of Mali is combatting the erosion of public trust and the problems of governance, security, and political economy that undermine the re-establishment of its authority and that of the state. The slow and only partial progress of the implementation of the 2015 Agreement feeds negative opinion of the current administration and underscores the impression that the authority of the state is more and more corrupt, dysfunctional, discriminatory, and predatory.

The supporters of change and the actors seeking to bring it about, inside and outside of the Malian administration, have difficulty embodying the idea that political change—that different politicians sharing the same networks and practices—can transform governance, successfully implement the peace process, and ensure socioeconomic development. The failure to achieve credible political change results from the limited strategic vision of the political actors, from the limited autonomy for elaborating policies, from a socioeconomic context that makes institutional reform an arduous task, and from the effects of a strong dependence on technical assistance and funding from outside the country. Despite the flow of international aid, Mali lacks the resources necessary to support the model of accelerated political and economic modernization inherited from its colonial past, from the period of decolonization, and from its experience of democratization.

In addition, the consequences of the uneven presence and the uneven performance of the state and its representatives have a tendency to merge with a general lack of trust between the various actors involved in the peace process, and between the elites from the signatory groups and the persons whom they represent. The issue of representativeness (who can speak to whom and in whose name) remains fundamental not only within non-state groups, but also for the credibility of Malian administrators to represent a public interest beyond the tactics of preservation: of power, and of access to resources for international cooperation and clientelist relations.

As for the mechanisms for managing the conflicts at the community or local level, they are no longer as effective as they were ten years ago, and they do not have the robustness that they had at the end of the 1990s. Consequently, the key question is the level of trust, support, or respect granted to the community leaders who represent official administrative structures. This question is particularly important for youth, for young Malians (particularly young Malian men) have less and less to lose, especially when they are marginalized both by the state authorities and by the traditional authorities who control access to opportunities and to resources through their clientelist networks.

The social divisions predisposing Mali to conflict (for example, those related to the struggle to obtain the means of subsistence) are more and more militarized, with ethnic elements exacerbating tensions, so that the risk of violence has considerably increased.

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Although the state is at the centre of numerous problems, and although extremely intense and even violent struggles around state authority objectives sometimes erupt, legitimate institutions of governance that are more representative and that respond more adequately to the needs and aspirations of the population are nevertheless necessary.  

The political demography of the conflict in Mali

The demographic trends in Mali reflect broader trends across sub-Saharan Africa: rapid population growth, high fertility rates, poor government services, and a surging urban, unemployed youth population. These factors may put the country at higher risk of conflict, but they do not constitute a causal explanation. In this sense, Mali’s demographic situation is similar to that of neighboring countries like Niger, Burkina Faso, and Guinea. However, there are variations in these demographic trends at the regional level, with high fertility and mortality rates being observed primarily in the urban zones of the south, the centre, and the west. The same rates are not found in the northern regions, especially not in Timbuktu and Gao. On the contrary, the Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal regions are depopulating with the result that their demographic weight is decreasing.

The trends for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) correlate more closely with the conflict dynamics in central and northern Mali. Indeed, there is a close correspondence between refugee flows and the upsurge in violence in 2012-2013, when the Gao and Timbuktu regions saw a large exodus of refugees who were leaving to seek shelter in the refugee camps the closest to their region of origin. Refugees are usually from smaller ethnic groups such as the Tuareg and the Fulani. However, refugee flows are mostly the consequence—not the cause—of the initial violence. Since few refugees have returned to their region of origin, it seems unlikely that the pressure of the returnees fuels the violence in Gao, Timbuktu, and Mopti. The situation of IDPs is slightly different. Many of them sought refuge in their region of origin although others, who initially sought refuge in the south, have since returned to their region of origin. This significant movement of human beings may have put pressure on local communities and labour markets and strained administrative resources.


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5 For more detailed information see Jonathan Sears, *Unmet Hopes to Govern Mali’s Persistent Crisis* (Montreal: Centre FrancoPaix, 2017).
Women and Conflict Dynamics

The 2012 crisis and its lingering effects have had an even greater impact on women than on men. Women and children have been largely displaced and are now living in precarious living conditions, especially with food insecurity. Women in Mali are subject to a wide array of forms of gendered violence, which constrains and/or enables situated gender identities and social positions at different times. As a result, female participation in or direct experience of armed conflict events, involvement in peacebuilding efforts or more formal political processes, and access to resources and services will all depend on one’s identified social categories and life histories. Thus, Malian women’s experiences of security and insecurity are inherently variable. Situated forms of agency depend on where an individual woman is located in relation to intersecting hierarchical structures of domination. For instance, a woman from an historically important Tamacheq tribe in Kidal is likely to experience insecurity and coercive violence less acutely, and participate in local political dialogue more regularly and with more of an impact, than a Dogon woman living in rural areas in the northern parts of the Ségon or Mopti regions where the Malian state is variably present and inter-communal violence is intense; while an middle-class Bambara woman originating from Sikasso and connected (in some way) to prominent political parties based in Bamako will experience insecurity even less than both of the former. Bamako lip service to inclusion of gender norms and rights, involvement in women’s rights forums supported by the international donor community or MINUSMA, therefore, may raise the social standing of some women who are positioned to more readily access those opportunities while leaving others far behind.

The Malian government has ratified several international conventions relating to inclusion of women’s rights, protection against gender-based violence, and participation of women in post-conflict political arrangements and programmes. The government has also developed a National Action Plan in association with UNSC Resolution 1325, which is to orient Malian programming on women, peace and security. In 2015, the Malian government also adopted a law installing a 30 percent gender quota for electoral lists and appointed government officials. Thus, on paper, the Malian government appears to have wider gender inclusion on its mind.

While the government has adopted such conventions as legal texts, the implementation of policies and programmes associated with international conventions lags severely in governmental practice. Policies associated with women’s participation in (post)conflict governance are no exception. For example, the armed conflict in Mali and subsequent negotiations for a political process to reconcile

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6 These include the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), ratified by Mali in 1985; the UNSC Resolution 1325 of 2000, for which Mali was a non-Permanent Security Council Member at its creation; and the UNSC Resolution 1820 of 2008.
7 Available at: [http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Mali%20pan%20fr-20140203.pdf](http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/Mali%20pan%20fr-20140203.pdf)
8 Loi n° 2015-052/ du 18 décembre 2015 instituant des mesures pour promouvoir le genre dans l’accès aux fonctions nominatives et électorales.
government and armed groups have been decidedly male-centric. Both during the Ouagadougou negotiations of 2012-2013, and those held in Algiers in 2014-2015, Malian men were by and large the only national participants to broker the peace agreement. Women are chronically under-represented in their formal inclusion in the Agreement’s official mechanisms. This is notably the case for the Agreement’s Monitoring Committee (CSA), and the recent establishment of the interim authorities for the Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu, Ménaka, and Taoudenni northern regions – of which there is only one selected female interim authority (Mariam Maïga – First Vice-President for Ménaka) out of fifteen.\(^9\) Participant observation in the National Office of the Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) conducted by a member of the Mali Project research team likewise suggests a meagre inclusion of women – only one female appointee (LtC Bintou Maïga) – selected for this institution, with few women working in administrative roles at the National Office in Bamako.\(^{10}\) Formal inclusion of women in the peace process and its multiple post-conflict governance institutions is extremely minimal.

In stark contrast, informal participation in peacebuilding initiatives, NGOs, civil society organizations representing women’s rights, local victims’ associations, students’ associations, and similar groups is often vibrant and inclusive of greater gender parity. Of note are the ‘Réseau femmes, paix et sécurité en Afrique de l’Ouest’ (REPSFECO), ‘Association des femmes pour les initiatives de paix’ (AFIP), the ‘Coordination des associations et ONG féminines du Mali’ (CAFO). MINUSMA in particular has been an international partner that has put forward opportunities for women’s organizations to meet with official members of the CSA, and to provide forums for claims-making to conflict actors regarding their demands for participation in Malian processes of peace consolidation.

While civil society organizations have dedicated much attention to women’s issues, this does not mean that all Malian women are represented equally, or benefit from peacebuilding activities evenly across the country. The asymmetric nature of the armed conflict itself and its geographical features have developed an uneven experience of (in)security for different gendered social categories amongst Malian women, which also impacts the degree of inclusion in, access to, and acceptance from different female-oriented civil society organizations. These include insecurity at the level of female bodies, food and livelihood insecurity, and insecurity connected to uneven access to service provision and protection. The country’s rural dynamics of insecurity, where the presence of the state is non-existent has meant that women living in rural zones have had to increasingly abide by the demands of armed Islamist groups associated with veiling and remaining in the private space of the home since 2015.

\(^9\) Interview with two Western diplomats involved in the CSA, January 2017. One of these diplomats has regularly asked Armed Group Signatory officials about the lack of presence of women in CSA business.

\(^{10}\) See also Bagayoko (2018) which demonstrates that female inclusion in Malian security institutions (Police, Gendarmerie, National Guard, and Armed Forces) remains less than eight percent.
example, in Dialloubé (50 km north of Mopti), armed Islamist fighters in mid-2017 had established roadblocks to verify if women were sitting beside men in local vehicles, punishing those that were with fines, harassment, and threat of beatings. In Dioungani (130 east of Mopti), a women’s head was forcefully shaved by supposed armed Islamist fighters when they found her in public without having veiled herself. In larger towns in central Mali such as Mopti or Sévaré, such forms of coercion are not common – and it is in larger cities where most women-centered NGOs operate. The result of such experiences for Malian women from rural zones is a hesitance to be in public settings, walking to markets, and other forms of reduced daily mobility – not only for fear of direct violence, but also from the hassle of dealing with such injunctions. Thus, unless NGOs venture to rural populations, which they often hesitate to do for fear of armed banditry, rural women must increase their mobility to large cities in order to access services and to participate in women’s forums, which they often feel is a risk that is too high to take.

While important, the rural-urban cleavage is not the only dynamic that conditions the possibilities of female participation in peacebuilding processes, or the likelihood of being present in events of armed conflict. One’s social affiliations (town, ethnic, class, ascribed status) also significantly shape how gendered insecurity is experienced in Mali. For example, as inter-communal violence has intensified in the Centre it has adversely impacted Fulani communities, with rural Fulani women and children bearing the brunt of the violence. This is notably the case from the beginning of 2018 with the increased involvement of ‘Donzo’ traditional hunter fighters (consisting predominantly of Mande ethnic groups from Mali’s south) that have been conducting attacks on Fulani settlements, at times burning down villages, reportedly (certainly rumoured to be) in coordination with the Malian Armed Forces. Donzo groups accuse Fulani communities of involvement in Jihadist violence against sedentary populations (Dogon and Bambara especially), and the Malian Armed Forces. Such inter-communal violence pushes local communities to choose which conflict actors will serve as the least violent option to act as their protectors, which often becomes solidified by marriage alliances. Thus, local Fulani patriarchs often pursue contingent protection arrangements with armed Islamist fighters (especially during transhumance periods), may offer a son to join their ranks, and marry their daughters to the fighters in order to lessen the familial economic load and to increase monetary resources. Since grooms must pay a bride price and provide daily money for food preparation to their wives, association with armed Islamist groups often prove to be a boon for many Fulani parents. Furthermore, Fulani women may themselves find that marriage to armed Islamist fighters will increase their security. Depending on their family’s religious upbringing, it is not necessarily the case that women married to armed Islamist fighters find their new husbands’ religious requirements to be especially burdensome and may support their husbands’ actions. Socio-economically prominent Fulani community leaders, meanwhile, may use their economic largesse to send their female family members to larger cities or to Bamako to stay with family members, which removes some Fulani women from situations of armed insecurity, or the prospect of marriage to a fighter. Thus, as
inter-communal violence expands across central Mali, particular groups of women experience insecurity differently due to their particularly situated ethnic, class, geographical, caste, and religious positions.

Certain intersected categories that constitute individual female identities in Mali will result in variable degrees of conflict victimization, access to resources for political claims-making or economic support, and the experience of security or insecurity more broadly. This variability of experience with regard to the Malian conflict must be taken into account in conflict analysis and in policy-making. It seems unwise to speak of ‘women’ as a universal category in a country where amongst some social groups violence against women of any kind will result in banishment of the violator (as is the case for Tamacheq communities) and where female genital mutilation (FGM) is unspeakable (as is the case for Mali’s Songhai, Tamacheq, and Arab communities), while in the more populous, and arguably politically-influential, ethnic groups of the country spousal abuse is a regular occurrence and FGM is common practice. While these other violent practices are more common per capita, and not associated with the Malian conflict’s origins and trajectories, they do illustrate the varying degrees to which Malian women are socially stigmatized. Only an analysis of Malian women’s intersectional subject positions can illuminate how they have and continue to experience, and indeed sometimes benefit from, the country’s asymmetric conflict.

The International Intervention

The MINUSMA mandate has evolved since the force was first created. In 2018 the focus is on providing support for the stabilization of the country, restoring the authority of the Malian state throughout the territory, and implementing the 2015 Agreement. In December 2017, Resolution 2391 added that MINUSMA would provide “specified operational and logistical support” to the joint G5 Sahel force when the defence and security forces of the G5 states intervene on Malian territory.

MINUSMA

It is now clear that the security situation in Mali has not improved since the MINUSMA deployment.11 This is not to suggest that the UN mission is entirely responsible for this deterioration; however, no one can deny that the limitations of its action remain numerous. In what follows, these limitations are categorized as organizational and strategic.

Organizational limitations

The statements and the judgements of the MINUSMA personnel who were interviewed are very critical, but they are also very difficult to verify. There is an undeniable consensus, in Bamako as well as in New York, that the mission is undermined by a distressing level of disorganization and by the lack of qualification of many of the personnel. The activity of MINUSMA is questioned by many (including by Malian authorities who regularly demand that it takes a more “robust” stance). These

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perceptions must be put into perspective and interpreted in the context of the situation in Mali, a context which is extremely difficult (and frustrating for UN personnel).

When it comes to the MINUSMA force, it is possible to identify three impediments to its action. First, there are the numerous difficulties associated with mobility: the main roads in the north are limited in number and in quality, which facilitates the attacks against UN forces; the sheer size of the territory adds to the logistical challenges; the Sahelian climate increases maintenance costs for equipment; the force depends on an air transport capability that is stretched to the limits. The force is not immobile, but its capability to react rapidly and to access remote towns and villages is insufficient to provide a stabilizing presence throughout the territory and to monitor or confirm the actions and abuses of the parties to the conflict.

Second, the composition of the force also raises questions. In particular, it contains a number of troops from the neighboring countries of the G5 Sahel (Burkina Faso 14.6%, Niger 7.3%, Chad 12.2%; for a total of 34.1% of the MINUSMA military service personnel, as of March 29, 2018). This way of constituting a force has come back into fashion even though it used to be criticized because of the potential conflicts of interest. The participation of troops from neighboring countries calls back into question the impartiality of the mission at a time when the division of labour with the French forces (see below) is already raising the same issue. This point is particularly important in the context of the deployment of the joint G5 Sahel force, for it will have an impact on the perceptions and the activities of locals when MINUSMA supports the G5 force. These Sahelian troops, who already have a bad reputation at the local level because of their sometimes predatory behavior, will also be supported in their action by France’s Operation Barkhane. It is difficult to predict the effects of these deployments on MINUSMA’s action, but it may make it more difficult for the mission to distance itself from Franco-Sahelian military operations.

Third, although the rapid rotation of troops is a normal practice, it impedes the integration and the efficient use of the new information collection and analysis capabilities. The ASIFU (All Sources Information Force Unit) offers a unique example of these capabilities, but its position and its tasks within the mission remain underutilized and also unstable, to the extent that the Unit is constantly being reinvented. Indeed, the rapid rotation of the command and the personnel leads the new arrivals to attempt to “reinvent the wheel.” Although in 2014 and 2015 the distance between the ASIFU, the JMAC (Joint Mission Analysis Centre), and the U2 (United 2 military intelligence staff) was criticized, at the beginning of 2018 the integration of the ASIFU into the U2 is being questioned once again.

As for the civilian mission, there is a general consensus on the “good offices” of the Special Representative and Head of the Mission, Mr. Mahamat Saleh Annadif, even though it is clear that the positions that he takes do not always

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receive unanimous approval. Beyond that, opinions differ and there tends to be a reference to mismanagement and a lack of communication between the various teams and the administrative offices. For example, the team in charge of mediation does not have the best of reputations within the Mission, but this seems to be largely because of a lack of knowledge of its work and because of a failure to communicate the effects of mediation on the ground. That being said, the Mission’s political dimension is completely determined by the limits and the framework imposed by the strategic context.

**Strategic Limitations**

A consensus took shape around the idea that MINUSMA is an “experiment,” a “special mission,” or a “pioneering mission,” but also that it is the current mission that is experiencing the greatest difficulties. This conception of MINUSMA reveals the peacekeeping crisis as it is described in the HIPPO (2015) and the Cruz (2017) reports. Without a doubt, it is often said, both in Bamako and in New York, that MINUSMA is not a “normal” peacekeeping mission, given the fluidity of the alliances, the complexity of the 2012 rebellion, and the ethnic and terrorist dimensions of a conflict environment perceived as extremely heterogeneous.

Although the Malian context is quite unusual and may partially explain the problems of the Mission, there is a tendency to overlook or to choose to ignore the international context in which MINUSMA was created. The context in question was shaped by a strategic framework that defined the Mission as a “war or a struggle against terrorism.” In 2013, Operation Serval was meant to free the Malian territory from the terrorist groups in order to create the conditions deemed necessary for deploying a UN mission and launching a process for peace and reconciliation. The transformation of Operation Serval into Operation Barkhane did not have an effect on this context. In fact, although the Barkhane force was deployed in a region officially defined by the G5 Sahel, it is still authorized today, by the MINUSMA mandate, to “use all means necessary” to intervene in support of the UN mission. The credibility conferred on the joint G5 Sahel force follows, with Resolution 2391 (2017) granting it a degree of international legitimacy, which also means operational and logistical support.

This strategic context is discussed in terms of a division of labour between the UN peacekeeping force and the “parallel forces” constituted by the French armies and supporting US, European and G5 Sahel elements. Thus, French-led counterterrorist operations are conceived as distinct from the UN peacekeeping operations and yet necessary for the deployment, the operational management, and the protection of the UN force.

The international intervention must be understood as an integral part of the conflict.

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system in Mali. The “common sense” notion that fighting terrorism in Mali is necessary to create a political space for the UN mission hides a crucial element. In this strategic environment, where war is deemed necessary as a means to make political activity possible in 15 to 20 years, the conflict system is perpetuated instead of dismantled. The structure and the dynamics of a “war on terrorism” have a major impact on the way that conflicts are generated and conducted, on the way that stakeholders perceive and interpret conflicts, and on the way that the latter are managed or resolved.

In the end, even if international counterterrorist forces can identify terrorists with precision, the latter still remain inextricably connected to the conflict dynamics in Mali. They participate in and shape the political and economic issues at stake in the armed conflicts. Consequently, taking action against them necessarily has a direct impact on the efforts by MINUSMA to resolve the conflicts. From a military perspective, this is clearly one sought-after effect. However, when counterterrorism is perceived as necessary for the creation of a political space conducive to a peace process, it sets boundaries to this political space and upsets the political balance that MINUSMA is striving to create. In other words, although the supporters of counterterrorism maintain that military action is necessary to make possible political action, counterterrorist activities are eminently political. Counterterrorism transforms the framework for conflict resolution by constantly postponing the promise of reconciliation and peace.\(^\text{15}\)

**Conclusion**

The FrancoPaix reports demonstrated that the destabilization that Mali is undergoing cannot be solely explained by the activism of jihadist groups, even though no one can deny that these groups play an important role in this destabilization. Underlying the violence that frequently erupts in the Malian conflict, there are in fact various conflicting interests and viewpoints. These interests and viewpoints intersect with each other and articulate local power struggles, intra- and intercommunity confrontations, and tribal and clan dissension against the background of an ever-increasing rejection of the Malian state. The jihadist groups appear to be unavoidable actors to the extent that they are inserted into these dynamics and that they can take advantage of them. Beyond their high degree of fragmentation, the organizational fluidity that characterizes these groups allows them to reorganize themselves and adjust their strategies. Based on the use of violence and terrorism, these strategies also involve attempts—whose success has been by no means insignificant in some regions—to impose themselves as alternative models of governance, with a resulting intensification of their recruitment. In this way, these groups help accentuate the legitimacy crisis faced by the Malian state across entire sections of its territory.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{15}\) For more information on the international intervention in Mali, see Bruno Charbonneau, *The Dilemmas of International Intervention in Mali* (Montreal: Centre FrancoPaix, 2017).

In these circumstances, the big risk for the financial backers is to fail to take a critical stance and to return to their former complacency in regard to the dysfunction of the Malian state, reproducing and preserving the notion of an ideal partner in international cooperation. The investments of donors in short-term results run the risk of providing support and tacitly endorsing the facade of progress or manifest improvement, whether it be with respect to security conditions, governance reforms, institutional capabilities, or the holding of elections. The anticipation that the 2018 elections will be the next step in the process of returning to a normal political situation mistakenly depends on overheated enthusiasm, and perhaps on exaggerated or misplaced expectations regarding the reestablishment of state authority. Moreover, if the significant anti-status quo trends, sentiments, and organized movements currently present in Mali are not adequately reflected in the results of these elections, there exists a real possibility of more generalized social disorder. This possibility represents a persistent challenge for incumbents as well as for newly elected members of government. In addition, there is still the problem of recreating legitimacy at many different levels. It has to be re-established at the level of the local, regional, and national power bases, as well as in the relationships with donors and in the negotiations for political autonomy that must take account of the multiplicity of interests and viewpoints.

As a result, we believe that it is imperative to promote collective strategic reflection. In our view, it is an error to concentrate on dialogue and on the relations between the parties to the conflict and to neglect the differences and the internal debates within these parties. Dialogue is insufficient when radical disagreements exist almost everywhere, when the signatory parties do not represent all the citizens and all the regions of the country, and when the third parties—the international mediators—are perceived as having hidden agendas. These mediators cannot be considered neutral, impartial, or disinterested, above all in the context of a “war on terrorism.” Strategically engaged reflection requires a clarification of the perceptions, the interests, and the objectives of everyone involved. This makes it possible not only to identify the radical disagreements with more precision, but also to identify some common ground. Strategically engaged reflection with the stakeholders in the conflicts has the potential to resolve the terrorist problem because it requires each party to respond to the issues of who represents whom in these conflicts and of what needs to be done by everyone involved, including the international actors. Those who are in a position of power will oppose and attempt to suppress this reflection, but the alternative is the short-term management of ever-reoccurring crises.
Annex 1 – Lessons learned for international intervention

Military intervention and UN peacekeeping

The international military intervention in Mali demonstrates the significant limits and the adverse effects of an overreliance on the military instrument for conflict management and resolution. In Mali, UN peacekeeping is confronted with attempts at reframing its finality; with strategies to authorize counterterrorist operations through the legitimizing morality of UN peacekeeping. The UN and its partners must protect the integrity of UN peacekeeping from the ways in which counterterrorism undermines its impartiality.

➢ The case of Mali shows that to strengthen UN peacekeeping and the political clout of UN missions, the Secretariat and DPKO must preserve the unique morality of UN peacekeeping; that is to take seriously the principle that UN peacekeepers have no enemies. Impartiality plays here a fundamental function as coercion is not inextricably linked to enmity. To isolate and preserve the specificity of UN peacekeeping—the ‘non-enmity clause’—the UN should develop its own peacekeeping doctrine;

➢ The case of Mali demonstrates the urgent need for developing new conceptual tools for conflict analysis. The emphasis on ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism’ conveys an understanding of violence as a form of moral collapse, as illegitimate and criminal, or as ‘development in reverse’. It severely limits policy options and the space for discussion and debate about the solutions and causes of conflict.

International aid and the security-development nexus

At the security–development nexus, international intervention in Mali underestimates the conflict-prone dynamics associated with the socio-economic changes sought by development stakeholders, and within the processes and relationships of intervention. Multiple stakeholders (bilateral and multilateral financial and technical partners, international NGOs, and Malian state and non-state actors) do not necessarily agree on development goals, or on the best means to these ends. In a security and development context dominated by counterterrorism and by preventing/countering violent extremism approaches, these means and ends are negotiated and implemented under conditions that restrict and distort development intervention discourses, policies, and practices.

➢ To engage Mali’s possibilities for development and peacebuilding, international intervenors needs to acknowledge frankly the broader ongoing change dynamics into which interventions insert themselves. These changes are socio-cultural, political-economic, and ecological, and interact with divisions around access to livelihood opportunities and resources. Even when development and capacity-building interventions achieve intended results, they can unintentionally produce or deepen inequities, which can be conflict-prone;

➢ Thus, the related need is to shift from approaches centered on counterterrorism
and preventing/countering violent extremism and re-focus on developmental peacebuilding, to address factors of instability at the community level across Mali’s diverse zones, with particular emphasis on politically and economically ‘border’ and ‘marginal’ zones;

➢ Governance processes (political and bureaucratic, in both civil and armed services) that reinforce disconnections between Mali’s state and its citizens remain especially problematic. To address the factors that undermine the capacity and legitimacy of state actors remains paramount. Fundamental challenges flow from: who (which stakeholders) own(s) what development priorities, and how committed to and capable of implementation they are.
Annex 2 – Lessons learned from the FrancoPaix methodology

The ‘Stabilizing Mali’ project was led by the director of the Centre FrancoPaix and organized around the expertise of the research team. Each expert was responsible for one aspect of the conflict analysis, for collecting and analyzing the data, and thus for writing that report. Regular workshops were held, attended by the research team and at times by invited guests or stakeholders, to monitor progress and to debate various issues. Conferences and consultation sessions were organized to dialogue with conflict actors and peace practitioners.

Lessons learned

➢ The research team model worked well to take advantage of interdisciplinary expertise and encouraged regular virtual exchanges that greatly benefited the analyses;
  o The research team could have been divided into smaller teams, each with its own leader and specific focus, to facilitate coordination;
  o Regular in-person exchanges are necessary but difficult to organize. More regular virtual meetings and exchanges should compensate too few in-person meetings and promote the participation of conflict actors and stakeholders.

➢ The research team shared common vocabulary and preoccupations (from political science backgrounds) that helped identify and clarify purpose and objectives;
  o Other preoccupations (whether from other academic disciplines or from stakeholders) are difficult to consider once the project starts;
  o Some flexibility and contingency plans must be included into the process from the beginning to allow for adjustments to unexpected changes, including those of a force majeure type, but limits to modifications, to what the project can accommodate, must be set.

➢ The involvement of conflict actors is a requirement;
  o This involvement should start at the project’s conception phase when the problématique and research questions are formulated;
  o Fieldwork is crucial for collecting data, but also for developing relations of trust between researchers and conflict actors;
  o Small focus-groups should be attached to the research team or to each research sub-team to provide continuous opportunities for exchanges.

➢ Non-directive cooperation with policy and conflict actors was essential in facilitating access, encouraging regular virtual exchanges, ensuring the precision and rigour of the analyses, and bridging the gap between academic and conflict actors’ preoccupations;
Conceptual and ‘translation’ problems between academic and policy worlds are sometimes obstacles to communication and exchanges. Yet, they are mostly beneficial, even an ‘added-value’, because they are opportunities for understanding differently, for seeing the world from other perspectives, thus a way to open up the political imagination; to imagine other research questions and policy options;

Within and through such interactions, researchers can become alternate actors for a conflict-resolution diplomacy that conflict actors cannot pursue. Yet, continuous reflection is necessary on how the independence of the research team is articulated with policy relevance, success in funding, and wide dissemination of the findings;

The fact that the core membership of the research team was Canadian (with one exception), it must be said, facilitated exchanges, the building of relations of trust, and the production of a unique perspective on conflict dynamics in Mali.
Annex 3: List of FrancoPaix’s Mali research reports

Reports


BENCHERIF, Adib. 2018. *From the “Tuareg question” to memories of conflict: In support of Mali’s reconciliation*. February/March.


SANDOR, Adam. 2017. *Insecurity, the Breakdown of Social Trust, and Armed Actor Governance in Central and Northern Mali*. August.


Bulletins related to the Mali Project


About the Centre FrancoPaix

Following the 15th Francophonie Summit and the Resolution on crisis situations, crisis resolution and peacebuilding in the French-speaking world, the Raoul-Dandurand Chair in Strategic and Diplomatic Studies set up the Centre FrancoPaix en résolution des conflits et missions de paix (in conflict resolution and peace missions) in order to support the strategic objectives of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) in conflict prevention and management.

Inaugurated in January 2016 with the financial support of the OIF, the mission of the Centre FrancoPaix includes:

• The promotion of scientific research and university training in French in the field of peace and conflict studies, in particular conflict resolution, conflict management and peace missions;

• The promotion of scientific research and university training about conflict resolution and conflict management in French-speaking countries, particularly in Africa;

• The production and diffusion of scientific research that focuses on conflict resolution and peace operations, particularly through knowledge production activities with policymakers and practitioners in the field;

• Enabling intellectual exchanges and the flow of knowledge by promoting mobility, innovation and collaboration between institutions, university researchers and students from the “Global North” and the “Global South”.

The Centre FrancoPaix in Conflict Resolution and Peace missions aims to promote scientific research, academic training and the development of conflict resolution research in the Francophonie.

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